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Abstract It has been suggested that individuals may
prevent partners from cheating by building up relation-
ships slowly, giving very little in the beginning and rais-
ing the stakes in subsequent moves if partners recipro-
cate. I tested this idea with field experiments on the
cleaner-fish Labroides dimidiatus and its “client” reef
fish. Clients visit cleaners at their small territories, so-
called cleaning stations, to have parasites removed.
Cleaners were first observed and then caught and either
put back on their original territory or moved to a new
site. I noted a variety of cleaner and client behaviour to
evaluate how, if at all, relationships are built up. Clean-
ers and resident clients indeed build up relationships, but
with heavy initial investment. There was no evidence
that cleaners build up relationships with client species
that have access to several cleaners. Finally, it appeared
that cleaners constantly invest in relationships with pre-
datory clients, possibly to reduce the risk that predators
try to catch them. I propose that asymmetries between
partners with respect to either payoff values or strategic
options are the major reason why the results do not fit
the so-called raising-the-stakes strategy.
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Introduction
The iterated prisoner’s dilemma game (Axelrod and
Hamilton 1981) has long been used as a paradigm for the
evolution of co-operation between unrelated individuals
(Dugatkin 1997). Though each of two partners playing a
prisoner’s dilemma game gains more by defecting than
by co-operating in each round, irrespectively of what the
partner does, repeated interactions may allow each to
overcome the temptation to cheat, since any cheating
would be reciprocated during future interactions. Recent-
ly, Roberts and Sherratt (1998) altered the assumption of
the original model that payoff-values are constant and al-
lowed individuals to vary investment in their partners.
They found that a strategy called “raising the stakes”
was evolutionarily stable. The strategy specifies that an
individual may initially invest a small unit in its partner
and increase the size of the unit subsequently if each do-
nation is matched by a larger reciprocal donation from
the partner. Otherwise, no further investment will be
made. The strategy thus avoids any large exploitation by
a non-cooperative partner and enables co-operative part-
ners to build up stable relationships with strong mutual
benefits.
Though the logic of Roberts and Sherratt’s model
(1998) is clearly appealing, a major challenge is to come
up with empirical data to test the model. Grooming data
on baboons failed to fit the model (Barrett et al. 2000),
but the approach was rather indirect, since interactions
between individuals were not observed from scratch.
Documenting the history of interactions from the very
first one to an established relationship (or its failure)
would be the ideal way to test the model. Some data on
the behaviour of schoolchildren do not fit the model (see
Keller and Reeve 1998). Instead, it appeared that chil-
dren were willing to invest a lot in the beginning to build
up relationships and generally exchanged less when the
relationship was established. In addition, if a friend did
not give, children responded by an increase in their do-
nations rather than stopping their own investment.
Here, I use Roberts and Sherratt’s model (1998) as a
guideline to develop questions about if and how cleaner
wrasses, Labroides dimidiatus, build up relationships
with other reef-fish species. L. dimidiatus removes para-
sites and other material from the surface, the gills and
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sometimes the mouth of so-called “client” reef fish
which actively visit them at their small territories, so-
called cleaning stations (recent reviews: Losey et al.
1999; Côté 2000). Cleaner-fish are ideal subjects for
catching and translocation in order to study how rela-
tionships with clients are built up. Nevertheless, it is im-
portant to acknowledge that the cleaner-fish mutualism
is not suitable for explicit testing of the original model.
This is because Roberts and Sherratt (1998) assumed that
both partners have the same set of strategies available, 
i. e. both partners can invest anything between nothing
and the maximal amount. The cleaner-fish mutualism,
however, is defined by marked asymmetries between
cleaners and clients in their strategic options. Consider
first the interaction between a cleaner and a predatory
client. Cleaners can cheat by feeding on healthy mucus
and scales rather than parasites and dead or infected ma-
terial (Randall 1958; Gorlick 1980; Bshary and Grutter
2002). Even so, the negative effects of cheating on the
predator are small compared to the reverse effect of a
cheating predator on a cleaner, since the latter would
loose its life. There is therefore a strong payoff asymme-
try in this game. A different game occurs between clean-
ers and non-predatory clients. Here, only the cleaner has
the option to cheat, while the client simply lacks that op-
tion as long as it tries to maximise its own payoff (clients
could be spiteful). There is therefore a strong asymmetry
in the strategy available to the partners. In conclusion,
my experiment tests if and how individuals have to build
up relationships to reap the maximal benefits of co-oper-
ation in rather asymmetric games.
I distinguished between three different client catego-
ries: (1) predators; (2) non-predatory resident clients
with small territories or home ranges that cover one
cleaning station only; and (3) non-predatory clients with
larger home ranges that allow them to access several
cleaning stations. The distinction between the last two
client categories seemed reasonable, since individuals of
these two categories differ in the way they respond to
cheating by a cleaner (Bshary and Grutter 2002). Client
species with access to several cleaning stations react by
swimming off and visiting another station (Bshary and
Schäffer 2002), while resident clients without a choice
chase the cleaner (Bshary and Grutter 2002). The latter
behaviour fulfils the criteria for punishment (Clutton-
Brock and Parker 1995) in that clients suffer a momen-
tary (energetic) cost from chasing which will benefit
them only during their next interaction with the cleaner,
which may be minutes later. Punishment theory relies on
the ability to recognise partners (individually or through
site fidelity), while the partner-switching of clients with
choices could keep cheating by cleaners to acceptable
levels in principle without any partner recognition. It is
thus conceivable that cleaners may build up relationships
with resident clients but not with clients with access to
several cleaning stations.
I first observed individual L. dimidiatus at their clean-
ing stations. Then I caught them the next day and either
released them at their original cleaning station or re-
leased them at a new site where no cleaner had been
present during at least the previous 3 weeks. The clean-
ers were observed immediately after the release, 2 h later
and 26 h later. I looked at the following aspects of inter-
action: (1) duration; (2) frequency of clients performing
jolts in response to cleaner-fish mouth contact; (3) fre-
quency of interactions that consisted purely of the clean-
er providing tactile stimulation to its client (host stabili-
sation; see Potts 1973). Jolt frequency is a good correlate
of cheating by cleaners (Bshary and Grutter 2002). Tac-
tile stimulation was defined as the cleaner touching the
client’s dorsal area with its pelvic and pectoral fins,
while the relative spatial positions of both remain con-
stant and the cleaner’s mouth points away from the cli-
ent. This behaviour is thus incompatible with foraging
(Potts 1973; Bshary and Würth 2001) and therefore a
good indicator of investment by the cleaner-fish in the
client. I also noted how often clients chased cleaners,
without cleaners trying to interact with them, and how
often clients responded to an approach by a cleaner by
evasive behaviour that prevented an interaction. If clean-
ers and clients build up relationships according to the
raising-the-stakes strategy, I predicted that cleaners in-
crease the tactile stimulation and reduce the amount of
cheating over repeated interactions. In turn, clients
should become more and more tolerant towards cheating
by cleaners, and the duration of interactions should in-
crease. If both sides have to invest initially to establish a
relationship, I predicted that cleaners initially provide
more tactile stimulation and refrain from cheating. Cli-
ents could be more tolerant towards cheating initially,
but, alternatively, they could make clear from the begin-
ning that they would not tolerate any cheating by the
cleaner. They could do that by chasing the cleaner with-
out explicit reason and by showing evasive action when
approached. If relationships are not to be established in
the cleaning mutualism, then interactions should be “av-
erage” right from the beginning.
Methods
Study site and study animals
The study was conducted at Mersa Bareika, Ras Mohammed Na-
tional Park, Egypt. The area consists mainly of isolated small cor-
al heads (patch reefs) which are isolated from each other by sandy
areas. Depth at the bottom of the patch reefs varied between 2 and
6 m. Each cleaner used in the experiment was a resident on one of
these patch reefs and without a partner. Cleaners were either sub-
adults or small adults, up to 6 cm in standard length. Data were
collected in May–June 1999 and October–November 1999.
Experimental set-up
Each cleaner was first observed for 60 min at its cleaning station.
The next day, but 2 h earlier, the cleaner-fish was caught with a
barrier net. It was placed in a plexiglas tube and I either dived to
another patch reef and released the cleaner there, or I dived in a
circle and released the cleaner back at its original patch reef.
Transferred cleaners were released at patch reefs that, to the best
of my knowledge, were without a cleaner for at least the previous
2
3 weeks, and I tried to match fish species composition of the pre-
vious and the new patch reef as far as possible. I alternated be-
tween translocating a cleaner and releasing a cleaner at its original
patch reef. Ideally, cleaners were observed immediately after their
release, for 15 min, 2 h after they had been caught, for 60 min,
and, in October–November 1999, again 26 h after they had been
caught, for another 60 min. This schedule was not always possi-
ble, since transferred cleaners tended to disappear overnight. In
three cases, the cleaners had apparently moved to adjacent patch
reefs; these fish were not observed further. Note that, with the
adopted observation schedule, cleaners were observed on three
consecutive days at the same time of day. Time of day varied be-
tween cleaners. Cleaners were caught between 0700 hours and
1400 hours, so the main observation sessions started between
0900 hours and 1600 hours. During all observation sessions,
cleaning interactions with clients were noted in the following way:
(1) species identity according to Randall (1983); (2) duration; (3)
number of client jolts; (4) tactile stimulation, or not, during the en-
tire interaction. In addition, it was noted if a client chased a clean-
er without being inspected and if a client reacted to a cleaner ap-
proach with evasive action, either aggression or flight.
As a control, I also transferred 12 other wrasses of the species
Pseudocheilinus hexalineatus, Thalassoma klunzingeri and T. lu-
nare. The last two species are facultative cleaners that often clean
as juveniles. The fish were observed for the first 15 min following
transfer, and the focus of attention was on whether or not other
fish responded to their presence with either unprovoked aggres-
sion or unprovoked flight.
Data analysis
For each cleaner, observation session and client category, I calcu-
lated the mean duration of interactions, client jolt frequency and
percent of cleaning interactions that consisted of tactile stimula-
tion only. In addition, I calculated the frequency of interactions
that consisted purely of clients chasing the cleaner and the fre-
quency of interactions in which inspection did not take place be-
cause the client evaded an approaching cleaner.
Statistics
Data were analysed with the statistical programme SPSS-X. All
tests were non-parametric and two-tailed.
Results
The data could be analysed in two different ways. One
could ask whether, for each cleaner, treatment had a sig-
nificant effect on behaviour, or compare cleaners that
have been transferred with cleaners that have been re-
leased at their original patch reef. I concentrate on the
latter analysis. Prior to manipulation, cleaners that were
to be translocated did not differ significantly from clean-
ers that were to be returned to their original patch reef,
with respect to any but one of the measured parameters
for any client category (Mann–Whitney U tests: all NS;
see Figs. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5). The only exception was that
cleaners that were to be moved were avoided more often
when they approached a resident client than were clean-
ers that were to be caught and returned to their reef
(Mann–Whitney U tests: m=12, n=10, U=27, P=0.03;
Fig. 2c). 
Interactions between cleaners and non-predatory 
residents
Manipulations had no significant effect on cleaning du-
ration (Mann–Whitney U tests: after 2 h, m=12, n=10,
U=47, P=0.41; after 26 h, m=7, n=6, U=17, P=0.62;
Fig. 1a). However, residents that interacted with translo-
cated cleaners jolted less frequently (Mann–Whitney U
tests: after 2 h, m=12, n=10, U=28.5, P=0.036; after
26 h, m=7, n=6, U=5, P=0.022; Fig. 1a) and received
more tactile stimulation (Mann–Whitney U tests: after
2 h, m=12, n=10, U=6, P<0.001; after 26 h, m=7, n=6,
U=0, P<0.001; Fig. 1a). In addition, translocated clean-
ers ignored residents less frequently after 2 h and tended
to do so still after 26 h (Mann–Whitney U tests: after
2 h, m=12, n=10, U=10, P<0.001; after 26 h, m=7, n=6,
U=10.5, P=0.09; Fig. 2a). Resident clients, on the other
hand, chased translocated cleaners spontaneously, which
never happened to cleaners that were returned to their
original reef (Mann–Whitney U tests: after 2 h, m=12,
n=10, U=0, P<0.001; after 26 h, m=7, n=6, U=5,
P=0.03; Fig. 2b). They also avoided translocated clean-
ers more often (Mann–Whitney U tests: after 2 h, m=12,
Fig. 1a–c Interactions between cleaners and non-predatory resi-
dent species. Cleaning duration (a), client jolt rate (b) and interac-
tions that consisted of tactile stimulation only (c)—before, 2 h af-
ter and 26 h after the manipulation. Open columns Cleaners caught
and put back; shaded columns cleaners caught and moved to an-
other patch reef; vertical capped lines median and interquartiles of
values for individual cleaners
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n=10, U=0, P<0.001; after 26 h, m=7, n=6, U=3.5,
P=0.008; Fig. 2c). Since this result was obtained prior to
manipulation, I also tested whether there were any sig-
nificant changes in a matched-pair design. Cleaners were
avoided significantly more often after translocation (Wil-
coxon test: n=10, T=0, P=0.002), whereas catching and
release at their original patch reef had no effect on avoid-
ance frequencies. 
Resident clients did not chase or avoid the 12 individ-
uals of other wrasse species that were transferred to a
new patch reef during the first 15 min following release.
The only exception was an olive dottyback, Pseudochro-
mis olivaceus, which attacked a six-stripe wrasse that en-
tered its coral. Also the 12 cleaners that were put back
on their original cleaning station were not chased or
avoided by residents. In contrast, translocated cleaners
experienced such behaviour frequently, between 5 and
34 times (median 10, n=10). Most often, the residents
chased the new cleaners without any apparent reason
(median 7, range 3–34), and sometimes they fled from
the cleaner. 
Interactions between cleaners and non-predatory clients
with choices
There were no significant differences between the two
cleaner-fish groups with respect to cleaning duration, cli-
ent jolt rate and interactions consisting of tactile stimula-
tion only after the manipulations (Mann–Whitney U
tests: all NS; Fig. 3). Cleaners never ignored a client
with choices (unless they had to choose between several
that were present simultaneously), and these clients nev-
er showed any spontaneous aggression towards cleaners.
Therefore, these data are not shown graphically.
Nevertheless, clients with choices were more likely to
flee from a translocated approaching cleaner than from 
a cleaner that was put back on its patch reef 2 h after 
the manipulation (Mann–Whitney U test: m=11, n=8,
U=16.5, P=0.025; Fig. 4).
Interactions between cleaners and predatory clients
There were no significant differences between the two
cleaner-fish groups with respect to cleaning duration or
Fig. 2a–c Interactions between cleaners and non-predatory resi-
dent species. Frequencies of cleaners ignoring inviting clients (a),
client spontaneous negative behaviour (aggression or fleeing) (b)
and client avoiding cleaners that invite an interaction (c)—before,
2 h after and 26 h after the manipulation. Open columns cleaners
caught and put back; shaded columns cleaners caught and moved
to another patch reef; vertical capped lines median and interquar-
tiles of values for individual cleaners
Fig. 3a–c Interactions between cleaners and non-predatory client
species with access to several cleaning stations. Cleaning duration
(a), client jolt rate (b) and interactions that consisted of tactile
stimulation only (c)—before, 2 h after and 26 h after the manipu-
lation. Open columns Cleaners caught and put back; shaded col-
umns cleaners caught and moved to another patch reef; vertical
capped lines median and interquartiles of values for individual
cleaners
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interactions consisting of tactile stimulation only after
the manipulations (Mann–Whitney U tests: all NS;
Fig. 5). Client jolts were too infrequent for any statistical
analysis. A predatory client was ignored once during all
observations (n=149). Predators did not show any spon-
taneous aggressive behaviour towards cleaners. A specif-
ic behaviour of a few groupers was to remain motionless
and open their mouth in a very exaggerated way initially
after a cleaner had been translocated, at distances of
about 1 m from the cleaners. Five individuals of Cephal-
opholis hemistiktos did so 2–5 times, and one individual
C. miniata did so twice. Such extreme opening of the
mouth is often observed when groupers have their mouth
inspected by cleaner-fish or cleaner shrimps (personal
observation). Predatory clients did not flee from ap-
proaching cleaners. In contrast, cleaners fled from preda-
tors on seven occasions during observations, once before
the experimental manipulation and six times after being
translocated. Thus, they were more likely to flee from a
resident predator after translocation than otherwise (bi-
nomial test: n=7, probability of event = (observation
time after translocation)/(total observation time) =0.33,
observed events =6, P=0.013).
Cleaners interacted with resident predators more fre-
quently 2 h after translocation than before (Wilcoxon
test: n=9, T=6, P=0.04).
Discussion
I looked at three different potentially co-operative
games, i. e. the game between cleaners and predatory cli-
ents, the game between cleaners and non-predatory cli-
ents with a choice of several cleaners, and the game be-
tween cleaners and non-predatory resident clients with a
choice of one cleaner only. I asked whether potentially
co-operative partners have to build up a relationship first
in order to receive the highest payoffs obtainable from
co-operation. If that was the case, I asked whether in-
vestment in the partner and the relationship was initially
low, as predicted by Roberts and Sherratt (1998), or
whether initial investment was high, as previously ob-
served in school children (see Keller and Reeve 1998). 
Interactions between cleaners and non-predatory 
residents
The data clearly show that initial interactions between
cleaners and non-predatory residents differ markedly
from interactions the cleaners had at their established
cleaning stations. Cleaners put in quite an effort initially
as they provided plenty of tactile stimulation, which is
incompatible with foraging and therefore a purely altru-
istic act from their perspective (Potts 1973; Bshary and
Würth 2001). In addition, they hardly ever took bites that
made clients jolt, indicating that they refrained from
cheating (Bshary and Grutter 2002). Thus cleaners start
with an initial heavy investment in their relationships
with non-predatory residents. It will be interesting to
look at other forms of co-operation or mutualism in
which one partner may profit from cheating while the
other one does not, to see whether initial heavy invest-
ment by the potential cheater is a general phenomenon in
such systems. 
Also, the residents invested initially in the relation-
ship. However, they did not invest to benefit the cleaners
but inflicted costs on them through unprovoked chases
and avoidance of approaching cleaners. It thus seemed
that residents started to punish cleaners even before the
latter had any opportunity to cheat them. Since residents
did not chase other wrasses that were transferred, it ap-
pears unlikely that the aggression towards cleaners was
due to a general aggression towards unfamiliar individu-
Fig. 4 Interactions between cleaners and non-predatory client spe-
cies with access to several cleaning stations. Frequencies of clients
avoiding cleaners that invite an interaction—before, 2 h after and
26 h after the manipulation. Open columns Cleaners caught and
put back; shaded columns cleaners caught and moved to another
patch reef; vertical capped lines median and interquartiles of val-
ues for individual cleaners
Fig. 5a, b Interactions between cleaners and predatory client spe-
cies. Cleaning duration (a) and interactions that consisted of tac-
tile stimulation only (b)—before, 2 h after and 26 h after the ma-
nipulation. Open columns Cleaners caught and put back; shaded
columns cleaners caught and moved to another patch reef; vertical
capped lines median and interquartiles of values for individual
cleaners
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als. Instead, resident clients, as potential victims of
cleaner-fish cheating, might have to show right from the
beginning that they will not tolerate any exploitation to
increase the co-operative level of the potential cheater.
Interactions between cleaners and non-predatory clients
with choices
Clients with access to several cleaners evaded approach-
ing cleaners more often if the cleaners had been moved
to a new patch reef. This could be interpreted as an ini-
tial doubt about the cleaners’ willingness to co-operate,
which cleaners should have to overcome by providing a
good service. However, cleaners did not offer any special
service to clients with choices after translocation. A pre-
vious study revealed that clients that arrive at a cleaning
station reproduce the behaviour of the previous client if
they could observe the cleaner’s last interaction (Bshary
2002). It is therefore most likely that, in the present
study, clients with choices sometimes saw resident cli-
ents evading or chasing the new cleaner and therefore
avoided an interaction when approached by the cleaner.
Clients with choices appear to control the behaviour of
cleaners simply by switching partners if the service was
bad (Bshary and Schäffer 2002). A cleaner that cheats
thus risks that one of his food patches will be at least
temporarily unavailable. The results presented here sug-
gest that this partner-control strategy makes the estab-
lishment of a personal relationship unnecessary. The re-
sults directly contrast existing models that predict that
mobility of partners hinders the evolution of co-opera-
tion (Dugatkin and Wilson 1991; Enquist and Leimar
1993). In the present example, stability arises because
the potential cheater is stationary while the potential vic-
tim is the rover and can exert choice. This is more simi-
lar to a model proposed by Ferriere and Michaud (1995),
in which co-operators move to find co-operators.
Interactions between cleaners and predatory residents
Similar to interactions between cleaners and clients with
choices, the data do not suggest that cleaners and preda-
tory residents have to establish a relationship to reap the
benefits of co-operation. As in previous studies (Bshary
2001; Bshary and Würth 2001), predators hardly ever
jolted during interactions and received plenty of tactile
stimulation. I suggest that cleaners might simply provide
a service quality that is above the predator’s threshold at
which it switches from co-operation to trying to eat the
cleaner. As long as predators constantly re-evaluate the
cleaners’ value as either cleaner or food source, the
cleaners will never alter their service quality, so their in-
vestment in the relationship with predators will remain
constant. An important open question is whether a preda-
tor’s decision-making depends on the integration of ex-
pected future benefits of repeated parasite removal, as
suggested by Trivers (1971), or whether the predator has
no temptation to cheat as long as a cleaner co-operates,
even during one interaction. Trivers (1971) suggested
that only the repeated removal of parasites eventually
outweighs the high but only once achievable payoff for
eating the cleaner. However, given that a cleaner-fish
would certainly try to escape any predation attempt and
terminate the interaction if successful, a predator’s pay-
off for cheating might as well be below its payoff for co-
operation within each interaction as long as the cleaner
co-operates. 
Transferred cleaners were more likely to flee from
predators without being attacked, a behaviour that usual-
ly occurred extremely rarely, and thus indicates that
cleaners are weary of potentially-cheating predators or of
predators making mistakes. These observations and the
increase in interaction frequency between transferred
cleaners and resident predators (there are hardly any data
on interactions between cleaners and visiting predators)
suggest that some trust has to be built up. The latter re-
sult has to be treated with caution, however, since it was
not predicted and the explanation is therefore post hoc.
Even so, the observation that some groupers widely
opened their mouth initially indicates that cleaners and
resident predators build up relationships. Groupers en-
gulf their prey by a sucking action with a rapid opening
of their mouth, so the exaggerated opening of the mouth
might make any attempt at predation very unlikely to be
successful. The behaviour might thus function as a signal
to the cleaner that the client wants to co-operate.
In conclusion, it appears that, depending on the nature
of asymmetry (payoffs or strategic options) and the cor-
responding control mechanisms that clients use to con-
trol cleaner-fish behaviour, relationships have to be es-
tablished or not. No data set supports the idea that rela-
tionships are built up by increasing investment in the
partner (Roberts and Sherratt 1998). On the contrary,
cleaners and non-predatory residents invest initially, the
cleaner in the client and the client in the control mecha-
nism of punishment. This means that a roving strategy is
very costly for a cleaner, since the resident clients will
harass it initially wherever it goes. There is thus a strong
pressure on cleaners to show site fidelity. From the cli-
ents’ perspective, however, the option to switch between
partners appears to be a very reliable partner-control op-
tion that is based on very simple rules and does not war-
rant any relationship with the cleaners. In this context, it
is interesting to note that some other cleaner-fish species
are less territorial than L. dimidiatus and cover much
larger areas (see Henriques and Almada 1997). In these
species, roving strategies might therefore be found. In
interactions with predators, cleaners are initially wary of
cheating, but also seem to try to establish a relationship
quickly. This might be important for cleaners to avoid
any attack while inspecting other clients. Overall, the da-
ta clearly emphasise our need for further empirical stud-
ies and new models on the evolution of co-operation be-
tween unrelated individuals.
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